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INTRODUCTION 
Posters depicting a scandalously dressed woman line 
Belgian streets.1  One such poster catches the attention of a 
passerby.  His eyes are immediately drawn to her long, 
exposed legs and tall stilettos, prominently displaying red 
lacquered outsoles.2  The iconic red-soled stilettos are easily 
recognizable as Christian Louboutin’s trademark.3 
Upon further inspection, the man discovers that the 
poster actually depicts a provocative political advertisement, 
created and distributed in Belgium by the Flemish, anti-
immigrant, far right-wing Vlaams Belang party.4  This 
Flemish group campaigns against the influx of Muslim 
immigrants in their “Women Against Islamisation” 
Campaign.5  The ad features former Miss Belgium and 
current senator, Anke Vandermeersch.6 
Beside the image of [Vandermeersch] wearing the shoes, a 
key show[s] what it claim[s] [is] Islam’s view of a woman, 
as measured by the length of her skirt, from “sharia 
 
 1. See infra Appendix, Figure 1. 
 2. See Bianca London, Christian Louboutin Wins Court Ruling Against 
Anti-Islam Group Who ‘Tarnished’ the Brand’s Image by Featuring Iconic Red-
Soled Shoes in their Paraphernalia, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 16, 2013, 7:43 AM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2462621/Christian-Louboutin-wins-
court-ruling-anti-Islam-group-Women-Against-Islamisation.html. 
 3. CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN, Registration No. 3,376,197; see also 
Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 
206, 212 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Louboutin’s trademark, which covers the red, 
lacquered outsole of a woman’s high fashion shoe, has acquired limited 
“secondary meaning” as a distinctive symbol that identifies the Louboutin 
brand.”). 
 4. Designer Louboutin Wins Court Ban on Anti-Islam Ad, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE (Oct. 14, 2013), available at 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/131014/designer-louboutin-wins-
court-ban-anti-islam-ad (“The Flemish Interest party has suffered in the polls in 
recent years and regularly launches provocative media campaigns against what 
it calls the ‘ Islamisation’  of Belgium.”). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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compatible” at floor level to “whore” just above the knee 
and “stoning” at the top of the thigh.7 
Not surprisingly, Louboutin requested the Antwerp Court in 
Belgium to issue an emergency “cease and desist” order 
against the Flemish group’s unauthorized use because it 
“tarnished his image.”8  Ms. Vandermeersch, the group’s 
spokesperson replied, “Are politicians still allowed to dress 
the way they want?  A legal judgment on a dress code for 
politicians would be a surreal precedent.”9 
Contrary to Ms. Vandermeersch’s belief, Louboutin was 
not concerned with her style of dress; rather, Louboutin did 
not want his brand to be associated with an anti-Islamic 
message.10  The court granted Louboutin’s request and 
ordered the removal of all the posters within twenty-four 
hours.11  Post-injunction, the group tweeted a revised poster,12 
portraying the same political message, but with yellow 
soles.13  Thus, Louboutin succeeded in preserving his brand 
and reputation in Europe and the Flemish group continued to 
spread their message. 
Louboutin might not fare as well in the United States.  
First, it is unlikely that a U.S. court would find the Flemish 
group infringed Louboutin’s trademark because consumers 
are unlikely to be confused as to the source or sponsorship of 
the posters.14  Second, this exact situation in the United 
States could not result in a successful tarnishment claim due 
to the noncommercial use exception,15 which allows 
unauthorized use of a registered trademark in noncommercial 
 
 7. Louboutin Wins Lawsuit Against Anti-Islam Group, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/14/louboutin-lawsuit-
anti-islam_n_4098593.html. 
 8. Designer Louboutin Wins Court Ban on Anti-Islam Ad, supra note 4. 
 9. London, supra note 2. 
 10. Economically, this makes sense.  As Arabian Business reports, the 
luxury goods market in the Middle East is growing, fast.  With projected sales of 
$7.7 billion, the Middle East is among the ten largest luxury goods market in 
the world.  Andy Sambridge, MidEast Luxury Retail Market Worth $7.7bn, 
ARABIANBUSINESS.COM (July 13, 2013), 
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/mideast-luxury-retail-market-worth-7-7bn-
study-508678.html. 
 11. Louboutin Wins Lawsuit Against Anti-Islam Group, supra note 7. 
 12. See infra Appendix, Figure 3. 
 13. Louboutin Wins Lawsuit Against Anti-Islam Group, supra note 7. 
 14. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 15. Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C) (2012). 
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speech.16  This Comment will analyze why the noncommercial 
use exception excludes Louboutin from successfully bringing 
a cause of action for trademark protection and will argue why 
Congress should remove the exception from the dilution 
statute. To properly balance trademark and constitutional 
rights, courts should focus on two questions: (1) whether the 
unauthorized use is relevant to the message being 
communicated, and (2) whether the use presents a risk of 
economic harm through loss of goodwill to the trademark 
owner from association with the undesired speech. 
Part I of this Comment gives background information 
about United States trademark laws and an overview of First 
Amendment jurisprudence.17  Part II will demonstrate the 
existing law’s failure to protect mark owners from harmful 
unauthorized uses, illustrated by Louboutin’s suit, which if 
brought in the United States, would likely not result in an 
injunction.18  Lastly, Part III will propose a change to the 
existing federal trademark statute, which will provide 
trademark owners a just result compatible with trademark 
and First Amendment objectives.19 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. United States Trademark Law 
Trademark law addresses two policies.20  First, it 
promotes the public’s interest in receiving truthful, relevant 
information regarding the source of goods and services in the 
marketplace.21  Second, it protects trademark owners’ 
 
 16. See discussion infra Part II, for an explanation of the likely result in 
U.S. courts under current law. 
 17. See infra Part I. 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3–5 (1946) (“The purpose underlying any 
trademark statute is twofold.  One is to protect the public so it may be confident 
that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it 
favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get.  
Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money 
in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment from 
its misappropriation by pirates and cheats.”). 
 21. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 
(2003) (“Federal trademark law . . . by preventing competitors from copying a 
‘ source-identifying mark,’ ‘reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and 
making purchasing decisions’ .  . . .” (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. 
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business goodwill22 from economic and reputational harm 
that stems from consumer confusion as to source, or dilution 
by blurring or tarnishment.23 
Federal trademark law, enacted by Congress in 1946, 
establishes a “statutory framework for the registration and 
protection of trademarks for goods and services.”24  Named 
the Lanham Act,25 the law defines a trademark as any word, 
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, used by 
a person to distinguish and indicate the source of his or her 
goods.26  Provided the mark creates a “distinct commercial 
impression” on the viewer or listener27—one that primarily 
distinguishes the goods of one person from the goods of 
others—it may be registered.28 
The Lanham Act provides registered trademark owners 
 
Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995)). 
 22. See Marlene B. Hanson & W. Casey Walls, Protecting Trademark 
Goodwill: The Case For a Federal Standard of Misappropriation, 81 
TRADEMARK REP. 480, 485–95 (1991), for an excellent discussion on the 
importance of protecting trademark goodwill. 
 23. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (“[T]he 
law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap 
the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product.”); 
see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992) 
(“Protection of trade dress, no less than of trademarks, serves the Act’s purpose 
to secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and to protect 
the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers.” (quoting 
Park N’ Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (citations 
and internal quotations omitted)). 
 24. Serbin v. Ziebart Intern. Corp., Inc., 11 F.3d 1163, 1164 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2000 & Supp. 2006).  The Lanham Act is the 
federal statute regulating trademark rights.  See SIEGRUN D. KANE, 
TRADEMARK LAW: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE § 1:2.1, at 1–9 to 1–11 (4th ed. 
2005).  See also Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162. 
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.  Marks indicating the source of services are also 
protected under the Lanham Act, but for the purposes of this paper I will refer 
to service marks as trademarks. Lanham Act § 3, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 429 (1946) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §1053 (2012)). 
 27. Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 29 (1st 
Cir. 2008). 
 28. MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:10 (4th ed. 
2014).  “Designs (e.g. Nike Swoosh Design), product shapes (e.g. the shape of the 
Coca-Cola bottle), slogans (e.g. Nike’s “Just do it”), sounds (e.g. the NBC 
chimes), colors (e.g. green gold color for dry cleaning pads), and even smell (e.g. 
a floral fragrance serving as a trademark for sewing thread), are all recognized 
and protected as trademarks.”  See also Uche U. Ewelukwa, Article: 
Comparative Trademark Law: Fair Use Defense in the United States and 
Europe—The Changing Landscape of Trademark Law, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 97, 
100 (2006) (citations omitted). 
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with the “exclusive right to use the registered mark in 
commerce on or in connection with the goods or services 
specified,”29 subject to certain “legal or equitable defense[s] or 
defect[s].”30  The Lanham Act provides three causes of action 
for registered marks.31  Section 32 provides registered mark 
owners a cause of action for the “exclusive right to use” 
articulated in section 33(a).32  Section 43(a) provides 
registered and unregistered marks with a cause of action for 
any false designation of origin, false description, or false or 
misleading representation of fact that is likely to lead to 
consumer confusion.33  Additionally, section 43(c) provides, in 
part, for injunctive relief against dilution by blurring or 
tarnishment.34 
1. Likelihood of Confusion Under the Lanham Act 
Under the Lanham Act, a registered mark owner may 
protect their trademark from unauthorized use in connection 
with goods or services.35  The unauthorized use must be in 
commerce and likely to cause consumer confusion as to source 
or sponsorship.36  If both infringement criteria are met, the 
trademark owner may be compensated with damages37 or 
injunctive relief.38 
The Lanham Act sets forth two main requirements in 
order to bring an infringement cause of action against an 
unauthorized use.39  The “use in commerce” requirement 
functions primarily as a jurisdictional nexus, allowing 
Congress to regulate under the Commerce Clause.40  Courts 
generally find this requirement satisfied because it “does not 
 
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 1115. 
 30. Id.  See infra note 48 for a list of defenses. 
 31. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1115, 1125(a), 1125(c). 
 32. Id. §§ 1114, 1115(a).  The Lanham Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–
1127 and is also referred to in its parallel number scheme: Lanham Act §§ 1–45. 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
 34. Id. § 1125(c)(1). 
 35. See id. § 1114(1)(a). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. § 1117(a). 
 38. Id. § 1116(a). 
 39. See id. § 1114. 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see also United We Stand Am., Inc. v. 
United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1997); Bosley 
Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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require any actual sale of goods and services.”41  The element 
is satisfied if the mark is placed on the goods, their 
containers, the associated display, affixed on the tags or 
labels, “or if the nature of the goods makes such placements 
impracticable then on documents associated with the goods or 
their sale, and the goods are sold or transported in 
commerce . . . .”42 
The second requirement, “likelihood of confusion,” 
requires a more demanding analysis than the former.  Courts 
must decide whether the unauthorized use will confuse 
consumers as to source or sponsorship of a mark.43  Federal 
courts analyze a number of factors to be considered in 
determining whether the use is likely to confuse.44  In AMF, 
Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit articulated the following factors for the likelihood of 
confusion evaluation: (1) strength of the mark, (2) proximity 
of the goods, (3) similarity of the marks, (4) evidence of actual 
confusion, (5) marketing channels used, (6) type of goods and 
the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser, (7) 
defendant’s intent in selecting the mark, and (8) the 
likelihood of expansion of the product lines.45  Courts weigh 
each factor differently depending on the circumstance.46  
Typically, the weight given to any factor is determined by 
how applicable that factor is to the given marks.47 
2. Statutory and Common Law Defenses to Trademark 
Infringement 
Trademark law provides alleged infringers with several 
defenses.48  An unauthorized user can assert such defenses 
 
 41. Kremer, 403 F.3d at 679. 
 42. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
 43. Id. § 1114(1)(a). 
 44. “While the list of factors followed by the courts all owe their origin to the 
1938 Restatement of Torts, each of the 13 federal circuit courts of appeals has 
developed its own version of the list and each appears to be jealous of its own 
formulation of factors.”  MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 24:30 (4th ed. 2014). 
 45. AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 46. Brookfield Communs. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 
(9th Cir. 1999) (“Some factors are much more important than others, and the 
relative importance of each individual factor will be fact specific.”). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Some defenses not discussed in this paper include functionality, fraud in 
obtaining registration or incontestable status, abandonment, misrepresentative 
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even when the mark owner successfully proves likelihood of 
confusion and the other elements of a prima facie case of 
infringement.49  One such statutory defense, codified in 
section 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act, is the fair use defense.50  
To demonstrate fair use, an unauthorized mark user must 
demonstrate that the mark was used descriptively, in good 
faith, and other than as the mark.51  For example, the well-
known electronic retailer’s registered mark BEST BUY 
cannot bar all uses of “best buy” because “best buy” is 
descriptive—it describes the price and quality of a product.52 
Common law nominative fair use is also available to 
infringers in some jurisdictions.53  Unlike statutory fair use, 
described above, nominative fair use requires the accused 
infringer to use the mark in its secondary, trademark sense.54  
The Ninth Circuit, in holding that the use of a popular boy 
band’s trademark in public opinion polls without their 
permission was permitted because the use qualified as a 
nominative fair use, articulated the following test for 
nominative fair use: 
First, the product or services in question must be one not 
readily identifiable without use of the trademark; second, 
only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is 
reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; 
and third, the user must do nothing that would, in 
 
use of the mark by the trademark owner, prior use of the mark by a defendant, 
antitrust violations by the trademark owner, and equitable principles.  See 
Lanham Act § 33(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b); see also, Ewelukwa, supra note 28, at 
128 n.221. 
 49. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 
111, 124 (2004). 
 50. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4). 
 51. See generally Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(holding unauthorized mark users did not establish a fair use defense under 
Lanham Act Section 33(b)(4) because they did not demonstrate that their use 
was other than as a mark, was descriptive, or was used in good faith). 
 52. Best Buy Warehouse v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 824, 826 (W.D. 
Mo. 1989), aff’d, 920 F.2d 536 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 53. See Carl Regelmann, Trademark Nominative Fair Use: The Relevance of 
the “New Kids on the Block Factors” After the Supreme Court KP Permanent 
Make-Up v. Lasting Impression Decision, 16 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 1, 8–
9 (2005); see also Peter M. Brody & Alexandra J. Roberts, What’s In a Domain 
Name? Nominative Fair Use Online After Toyota v. Tabari, 100 TRADEMARK 
REP. 1290, 1299–1318 (2010) (explaining federal circuit court treatment of the 
nominative fair use doctrine). 
 54. New Kids on the Block v. News America Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 
(9th Cir. 1992). 
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conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or 
endorsement by the trademark holder.55 
Nominative fair use is also recognized in the Second,56 
Third,57 Fifth,58 and Eighth Circuits,59 but the Sixth Circuit 
expressly rejects nominative fair use as a substitute for the 
multi-factor likelihood of confusion analysis.60 
3. Federal Trademark Dilution 
The federal trademark dilution statute gives a famous 
mark owner the ability to enjoin unauthorized use of its 
famous marks if the use is “likely to cause dilution by 
blurring or dilution by tarnishment.”61  Trademark dilution, 
unlike trademark infringement, does not require consumer 
confusion.62  Instead dilution “protect[s] the trademark 
owners from an appropriation-of, or free-riding-on the 
substantial investments . . . made in their mark.”63  Congress 
enacted the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”),64 
codified in section 43(c) of the Lanham Act, in 1995 and 
revised it in 2006.  The 2006 revision, called the Trademark 
Dilution Revision Act (“TDRA”),65 overruled the Supreme 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(acknowledging the district court’s application of the Ninth Circuit’s nominative 
fair use test to support its dismissal of an infringement complaint). 
 57. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 228 
(3d Cir. 2005) (reversing the district court’s injunction and remanding for 
analysis under the majority’s articulated two-part nominative fair use test). 
 58. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 546 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(formulating a test for nominative fair use which includes an analysis of 
likelihood of confusion). 
 59. See Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Laboratories, 815 F.2d 500, 
503 (8th Cir. 1987); see also Brody & Roberts, supra note 53, at 1312–13 (“The 
Eighth Circuit has generally adhered to the principle of nominative fair use 
without formulating any specific test.”). 
 60. See PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., LLC, 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 
2003) (rejecting nominative fair use analysis as substitute for traditional multi-
factor analysis of likelihood of confusion). 
 61. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2006). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 64. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–98, § 3, 109 
Stat. 985, 985 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012)). 
 65. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–312, 120 
Stat. 1730, 1731–33 (2006). 
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Court’s holding in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue66 that “actual 
dilution” must be shown.67  The TDRA changed the standard 
from “causes dilution” to “likely to cause dilution.”68  
Alongside clarifying issues involving fame and commercial 
use, the TDRA also articulated two specific types of dilution: 
dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment.69 
The TDRA defines dilution by blurring as an “association 
arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name 
and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the 
famous mark.”70  To determine dilution by blurring, the 
TDRA instructs courts to consider factors such as similarity, 
distinctiveness, exclusive use by the famous mark owner, 
recognition, defendant’s intent, and actual association 
between defendant’s mark and the famous mark.71  Dilution 
by tarnishment is important to trademark owners because it 
protects the trademark owner’s considerable investment in 
ensuring that consumers maintain positive associations with 
the trademark.72  Use of a trademark in a negative context, 
such as in the context of sexual activity,73 obscenity, or illegal 
activity,74 is contrary to that goal.75 
A requirement for bringing a dilution cause of action 
under the TDRA is fame.76  Under the TDRA, “a mark is 
famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming 
 
 66. 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003). 
 67. Id. (“The relevant text of the [Federal Trademark Dilution Act] . . . 
unambiguously requires a showing of actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of 
dilution.”), superseded by statute, Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 
Pub. L. No. 109–312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730, 1731–32 (2006). 
 68. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–312, § 2, 120 
Stat. 1730 (2006). 
 69. Id. 
 70. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Adidas Am., Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1060 
(D. Or. 2008) (citing Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 
1002, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 73. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 392 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that “Victor’s Little Secret” when use to sell sexual toys, videos, and 
similar soft-core pornographic products tarnished the famous mark 
VICTORIA’S SECRET). 
 74. Navajo Nation v. Urban Outfitter, Inc., 935 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1168 
(D.N.M. 2013) (citing Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 
497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
 75. Moseley, 605 F.3d at 384–85. 
 76. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). 
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public of the United States as a designation of a source of the 
goods or services of the mark’s owner.”77  Several factors help 
determine whether a mark is famous.78  These include the 
mark’s advertising, the amount, volume, geographic extent of 
goods or services sold under the mark, actual recognition of 
the mark, and when and how the mark was registered.79  
Courts often deny relief when a mark is found to be 
insufficiently famous.80  “Some examples of marks that have 
been found to be insufficiently famous marks under the 
TDRA are: CHARLOTTE for clothing and accessories; 
JARRITOS for soft drinks; SUNSHINE IN A BOX for 
sunlamps; [and] the University of Texas ‘longhorn 
logo . . . .’ ” 81  Examples of famous marks include “NIKE; 
PEPSI; eBAY, the adidas ‘Three-Stripe Mark’ for shoes; and 
Louis Vuitton ‘Monogram Multicolore Mark’ for handbags.’ ” 82  
“Courts have also assumed—without deciding—that the 
following marks are sufficiently famous under the TDRA: 
DIANE VON FURSTENBERG for dresses, STARBUCKS for 
coffee, and VICTORIA’S SECRET for lingerie.”83 
4. Exclusions and Defenses to Dilution under the TDRA 
The TDRA exempts certain unauthorized uses from a 
dilution cause of action.84  The exclusions, described in 
further detail in Part III, are: fair uses, including 
comparative advertising, parodies, criticisms, or comments on 
the famous mark owner’s goods or services;85 news reporting 
and commentary;86 and noncommercial uses.87  These 
exemptions are intended to preserve First Amendment speech 
 
 77. See id. § 1125(c)(2)(A). 
 78. See generally Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark 
Antidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1157–65 
(2006) (“This is a new formulation that provides guidance to the courts on how 
famous a mark must be to qualify for anti-dilution protection, something that 
the FTDA failed to do.”). 
 79. 15 U.S.C § 1125(c)(2)(A)(i)–(iv). 
 80. See Sarah Burstein, Dilution by Tarnishment: The New Cause of Action, 
98 TRADEMARK REP. 1189, 1217 (2008). 
 81. See id. at 1217 and accompanying footnotes. 
 82. See id. at 1218 and accompanying footnotes. 
 83. See id. 
 84. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3). 
 85. Id. § 1125(c)(3)(A). 
 86. Id. § 1125(c)(3)(B). 
 87. Id. § 1125(c)(3)(C). 
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rights.88 
B. Levels of Speech Protection Under the First 
Amendment 
In pertinent part, the First Amendment states that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”89  The First Amendment renders 
unconstitutional state action that prohibits or unduly 
burdens First Amendment speech rights.90  Any law that 
regulates speech based on its content and discriminates as to 
either viewpoint or subject matter91 is presumptively 
unconstitutional, and consequently must meet a rigorous 
strict scrutiny standard.92  To regulate speech based on 
content, the state must show the law is narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling governmental interest using the least 
restrictive means.93 
Overbroad and vague regulations must also meet strict 
scrutiny because these regulations have the ability to chill 
protected speech.94  In overbreadth cases “the possible harm 
to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go 
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected 
speech of others may be muted . . . .”95  Vague regulations 
chill speech because of the speaker’s uncertainty as to what is 
 
 88. MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:90 (4th ed. 
2014). 
 89. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 90. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 
(1992) (“The First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing 
speech or even expressive conduct, because of disapproval of the ideas 
expressed.” (citations omitted)). 
 91. Consol. Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980) 
(“The First Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulations extends not only 
to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public 
discussion of an entire topic.”). 
 92. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382; see also Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 540 
(“Where a government restricts the speech of a private person, the state action 
may be sustained only if the government can show that the regulation is a 
precisely drawn means of serving a compelling state interest.”). 
 93. Sable Comm’ns of Cal., Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“The 
Government may, however, regulate the content of constitutionally protected 
speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least 
restrictive means to further the articulated interest.”). 
 94. City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60–62, 64 (1999). 
 95. Broadrick v. Okla., 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). 
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protected or unprotected under the regulation.96  Both 
overbroad and vague regulations are unconstitutional and are 
struck by courts.97 
There are certain areas of speech that, while subject to 
heavier regulation, implicate less risk of deterring speech.  
For example, false or deceptive advertising is not protected 
speech because of its detriment to society.98  Another type of 
less-protected speech is commercial speech99—speech that 
“does no more than propose a commercial transaction.”100  
Commercial speech regulations are subject to a less rigorous 
standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v Public Service 
Comm’n:101 the regulation must “directly advance[] a 
substantial governmental interest” and “not [be] more 
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”102  The 
policy reason permitting heavier regulations on commercial 
speech is that the economic incentives in making commercial 
speech reduce any potential chilling effects of a regulation.103 
Applied to trademark law, the First Amendment allows 
purely commercial speech to be regulated by the TDRA.104  
However, the TDRA does not regulate noncommercial speech 
for fear that it “would allow trademark owners to suppress or 
inhibit discussion about them . . . [and] would thus represent 
an impermissible burden on free speech.”105 
 
 96. Morales, 527 U.S. at 59–60 (declaring an ordinance prohibiting loitering 
“in one place with no apparent purpose” as vague for definiteness and clarity). 
 97. See id. at 64. 
 98. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc. 425 U.S. 748, 769–70 (1976). 
 99. Id. at 771–72. 
 100. Id. at 762. 
 101. 447 U.S. 557, 557 (1980). 
 102. Id. at 564–66. 
 103. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977) (“Since 
advertising is linked to commercial well-being, it seems unlikely that such 
speech is particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulations.”). 
 104. Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d. 962, 974 
(C.D. Cal. 2007). 
 105. Michael K. Cantwell, Confusion, Dilution, and Speech: First Amendment 
Limitations on the Trademark Estate, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 48, 67 (1997); see 
also L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32–33 (1st Cir. 
1987). 
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II. ANALYSIS OF UNAUTHORIZED TRADEMARK USE IN 
NONCOMMERCIAL SPEECH 
Returning to the Louboutin case discussed above, the 
Flemish group’s Anti-Islam poster weakens the trademark’s 
reputation in the eyes of consumers, who likely identified the 
mark as accepting of all religions and races.  Although it is 
possible some minimal amount of consumer confusion may 
result—and a competent attorney would bring an 
infringement action—Louboutin’s injury is primarily due to 
consumers’ newly-ingrained and likely subconscious negative 
associations with the mark.  The poster’s controversial 
comment on Islam may cause consumers to associate the 
luxury red-soled stilettos with the poster’s negative political 
message.  This association is detrimental because the mark is 
used in a way antithetical to the mark owner’s presumptively 
positive uses.  If the Flemish group distributed the poster in 
the United States, Louboutin’s potential causes of action 
would be infringement and dilution by tarnishment.  
However, as this Comment will establish in Part II.A–Part 
III, both will fail. 
A. Trademark Infringement 
1. Likelihood of Confusion 
Once an infringement claim is brought in the United 
States, courts determine infringement liability by analyzing 
whether the use is likely to confuse consumers.106  The first 
factor is the strength of the mark.  Louboutin has an arguably 
strong mark because the red soles have gained secondary 
meaning in the luxury shoe market;107 however, colors are 
typically given narrow protection since a color is not 
inherently distinctive.108  Therefore, a court could go either 
way—strong or weak—in determining the strength of the 
mark.  Second, the proximity of the goods factor is unlikely to 
favor Louboutin because the Flemish group does not market 
or sell shoes.  The third factor, similarity of the marks, will 
 
 106. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 
111, 120 (2004). 
 107. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America Holding, Inc., 
696 F.3d 206, 226–27 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 108. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995). 
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likely favor Louboutin because the “sight, sound, and 
meaning” of the mark used in the Flemish group’s poster is in 
fact the same as Louboutin’s mark.109   
The other five factors are unfavorable, or at best, 
ambiguous.  The fourth factor, actual confusion, cannot be 
determined without survey evidence or actual testimony.110  
This evidence is not readily available.  The fifth factor, 
similarity of marketing channels, is also ambiguous.  On the 
one hand, Louboutin likely uses posters to market his brand 
and therefore this factor supports confusion.  On the other 
hand, this factor is arguably irrelevant because regardless of 
the marketing channel used, the poster can be found on the 
Internet through a few key search terms and shared 
instantaneously through online news sources and forums.111  
The unauthorized use may become well known, if not viral. 
The sixth factor, purchaser care and sophistication, will 
weigh against confusion.  Louboutin’s shoes are expensive 
and therefore consumers will likely take more time and care 
in making a purchasing decision.  These consumers are not 
likely to believe Louboutin would authorize his mark in the 
Flemish group’s tasteless poster. 
The seventh factor, intent, is difficult to discern, but the 
Flemish group would likely successfully argue it used the 
Louboutin stilettos in good faith because it only used the 
mark for decorative purposes, not to confuse consumers.  
Finally, the eighth factor, likelihood of expansion, would also 
weigh against Louboutin because it is unlikely Louboutin will 
start a political group, like the Anti-Islam group, 
antagonizing a large sector of his consumer base. 
Four of the eight Sleekcraft factors—proximity of the 
goods, degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser, 
defendant’s intent in selecting the mark, and likelihood of 
expansion—weigh against a likelihood of confusion.  
Moreover, three factors—strength of the mark, evidence of 
actual confusion, and marketing channels used—are either 
difficult to discern or just inapplicable to this unauthorized 
 
 109. Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 351. 
 110. See Fortune Dynamics, Inc. v. Victoria Secret Stores Brand Mgmt, Inc., 
618 F.3d 1025, 1035 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 111. Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns. Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (“Given the broad use of the Internet today . . . this factor merits little 
weight.”). 
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use.  Therefore, a court would likely find no confusion and 
therefore no infringement by the Anti-Islam Campaign 
poster. 
2. Trademark Infringement Defenses 
Although analyzing the Flemish group’s infringement 
defenses is moot because consumers are unlikely to be 
confused, this section will describe the First Amendment 
defense to infringement because it will play a key role in the 
proposal in Part III below.  Trademark infringers engaging in 
noncommercial speech often raise the First Amendment as a 
defense to their unauthorized use.  To balance First 
Amendment rights with those of the trademark owner, courts 
use the test set forth in Rogers v. Grimaldi.112  The Rogers 
test requires courts to inquire into whether a mark’s use is 
“artistically relevant” to the speech and whether the mark 
“explicitly mislead[s]” the public.113  Artistic relevance is 
satisfied when an unauthorized use of a mark is “‘ not 
arbitrarily chosen just to exploit the publicity value of the 
[plaintiff’s mark] but instead has genuine relevance [to the 
work].’ ”114  For example, in Rogers, the court held the title 
“Ginger and Fred,” for a film that depicted two performers 
nicknamed Ginger and Fred, was artistically relevant to the 
work.115 
If an expression is deemed artistically relevant, courts 
will then determine whether the use is “explicitly misleading” 
as to the source or content of the work.116  An explicitly 
misleading use leads the public to believe the mark owner 
“prepared or otherwise authorized” the use.117  Some 
examples of explicitly misleading uses are “Jane Fonda’s 
Workout Book”—a label for a book unaffiliated with Jane 
 
 112. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 113. Id. at 1000. 
 114. Louis Vuitton Mallatier [sic] S.A. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 868 F. 
Supp. 2d 172, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001). 
 115. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999–1000. 
 116. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1000; see also Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 
F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002) (adopting the Rogers test for artistic works); Parks 
v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 458 (6th Cir. 2003) (adopting the Rogers test 
in the context of expressive works and citing Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition § 47 cmt. c (1995))). 
 117. Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d 
Cir. 1993). 
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Fonda—and Pepsi’s Blog on Human Rights—a blog 
unaffiliated with Pepsi.118  In both circumstances, the 
unauthorized user is overtly misrepresenting his product as 
authored or sponsored by Jane Fonda and Pepsi, respectively. 
B. Trademark Dilution 
“Dilution law is the antithesis of trademark law . . . 
because it seeks to protect the mark from association in the 
public’s mind with wholly unrelated goods and services.”119  
Congress enacted the TDRA to prevent unauthorized uses 
that “seize upon the popularity of a trademark at the expense 
of the rightful owner and the public.”120  Unlike infringement, 
dilution causes of action do not require a likelihood of 
confusion.121 
1. Dilution by Tarnishment 
Dilution by tarnishment allows a trademark owner to 
enjoin an unauthorized use that diminishes the value of its 
mark by placing the mark in an unsavory context.122  To bring 
a dilution by tarnishment claim, the TDRA first requires the 
mark to be famous.123  A mark is famous “if it is widely 
recognized by the general consuming public of the United 
States as a designation of source of the goods or services of 
the mark’s owner.”124  The statute also lists a set of factors to 
help determine “whether a mark possesses the requisite 
degree of recognition.125  Those factors include: 
(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of 
advertising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised 
or publicized by the owner or third parties. 
 
 118. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001. 
 119. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 904 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 120. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 152 CONG. REC. H6964 (daily 
ed. Sept. 25, 2006). 
 121. See discussion supra Part II.B; see also San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 
Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 539 (1987) (“[E]ven if not 
confusing . . . [the mark] nevertheless may harm [mark owner] by lessening the 
distinctiveness and thus the commercial value of the marks.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 122. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 123. 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1). 
 124. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(A). 
 125. Id. 
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(ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of 
goods or services offered under the mark. 
(iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark. 
(iv) Whether the mark was registered under the Act of 
March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 1905, or on the 
principle register.126 
For Louboutin, the fame requirement could potentially 
impede his access to dilution causes of action since the luxury 
shoe designer may only have “niche fame” within the fashion-
knowledgeable consuming public not the general consuming 
public.127  “Niche fame” is specifically excluded by the TDRA 
“to prevent courts from labeling a mark as ‘famous’ because it 
is well-known only in a local geographical territory or in a 
local product or service line.”128  Nevertheless, since this may 
be a close call, a court will likely look to the TDRA’s factors to 
make this finding.  First, the Louboutin brand has invested 
substantial amounts in advertising, media coverage, and 
demonstrated sales success.129  Second, Louboutin sells about 
240,000 pairs a year with revenues of approximately $135 
million in 2011,130 but Louboutin’s recognition goes far beyond 
what these sales indicate due to its high degree of publicity.  
“The brand’s fame derives largely from the red outsole itself: 
interested consumers can instantly recognize the brand when 
they see a red-soled shoe gracing the red carpet or the pages 
of fashion publications.”131  Finally, Louboutin’s mark has 
been on the principal register since 2008.132  This factor 
analysis indicates that at least three of the four fame factors 
favor Louboutin’s wide degree of recognition. 
In addition, a survey of luxury designer trademark case 
law supports a court’s determination that Louboutin’s mark is 
 
 126. 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(2)(A). 
 127. See Haochen Sun, Reforming Anti-Dilution Protection in the 
Globalization of Luxury Brands, 45 Geo. J. Int’l L. 783, 806–07 (2014). 
 128. MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:105 (4th 
ed. 2014). 
 129. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America Holdings, Inc., 
696 F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 130. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America, Inc., 778 F. 
Supp. 2d. 445, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 131. Emilie Winckel, Comment, Hardly a Black-and-White Matter: Analyzing 
the Validity and Protection of Single-Color Trademarks Within the Fashion 
Industry, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1015, 1030 (2013). 
 132. U.S. Registration No. 3,376,197. 
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famous because of his marketing strategies.  In Malletier v. 
Dooney & Bourke, Inc,133 the court found that “Louis Vuitton’s 
Monogram Multicolore mark achieved a high level of fame in 
the broad fashion market” due to “widespread advertising, 
publicity, and sales of products bearing the Monogram 
Multicolore mark, and enjoyed a deluge of unsolicited media 
coverage and attention.”134  Another court found the fame 
requirement satisfied for the highly-marketed luxury brand, 
Burberry.135  Though luxury goods typically have niche fame, 
case law indicates that brands employing widespread 
marketing and advertising efforts meet the TDRA’s fame 
requirement.136  Here, Louboutin spends approximately $2 
million each year on promotional activities.137  Louboutin also 
engages in promotional activities such as cooperative 
advertising, loaning its shoes for highly publicized events, 
and unique collaborations, such as its 2009 collaboration with 
Mattel to celebrate BARBIE’s fiftieth anniversary.138  
Therefore, a court, relying on the TDRA’s fame factors and 
precedent, will likely find that Louboutin indeed meets the 
standard for fame. 
Next, a court will determine whether Louboutin’s mark 
was likely to be tarnished through an “association . . . that 
harms the reputation of the famous mark.”139  The poster 
harms Louboutin’s trademark by creating associations in the 
consumer’s mind with Islamic intolerance.140  Uses such as 
the Flemish group’s unauthorized use diminish a trademark 
 
 133. 561 F. Supp. 2d 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 134. Id. at 391 (internal quotations omitted). 
 135. Burberry Ltd. v. Euro Moda, Inc., 2009 WL 1675080 at *12 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (“Burberry has prominent advertising presence in the United States, 
placing advertisements of its products bearing the Burberry Marks in popular 
and widely circulated United States publications.”). 
 136. See Sun, supra note 127, at 807 (“Since the fame of a mark is essentially 
measured by advertising and marketing efforts made by the owner of the mark, 
these low-profile marketing strategies could make it difficult for the relevant 
luxury companies to prove the well-known status of their trademarks.”). 
 137. Brief for Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants-Appellants and Special 
Appendix at 14, Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America 
Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 11-3303-cv). 
 138. Id. 
 139. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). 
 140. See John D. Shakow, Note, Just Steal It: Political Sloganeering and the 
Rights of Trademark Holders, 14 J.L. & POLITICS 199, 208 (1998) (“Association 
with some political philosophies, when forced on a commercial actor, may well 
hurt the commercial prospects of the actor’s goods.”). 
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owner’s ability to “reap the financial, reputation-related 
rewards associated with a desirable product.”141  Continuous, 
unregulated association of a mark with divisive political 
speech considerably diminishes goodwill.142 
2. Defenses to Dilution—The TDRA’s Exceptions 
The TDRA has several defenses that exclude certain uses 
from a dilution cause of action.  Under the TDRA, section 
43(c)(3) states: 
The following shall not be actionable as dilution by 
blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this subsection: 
(A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair 
use, or facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by 
another person other than as a designation of source for 
the person’s own goods or services, including use in 
connection with— 
 (i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to 
compare goods or services; or 
 (ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting 
upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of 
the famous mark owner. 
(B) All forms of news reporting and news commentary. 
(C) Any noncommercial use of a mark.143 
The Flemish group’s use will not fall under the 
exceptions in section 43(c)(3)(A) or (B).  Under this set of 
facts, the trademark’s use is not descriptive because it does 
not propose to describe or promote its own non-trademark 
related message.144  A descriptive fair use cannot exist here 
because red soles do not have a primary meaning, or in other 
words, without Louboutin’s secondary meaning red soles are 
just red soles. 
Nor is the Flemish group’s use nominative fair use 
because it does not depict or compare Louboutin’s product to 
others.145  The poster was political propaganda for Woman 
Against Islamisation, a group which provides neither goods 
nor services.  A scenario where fair use could apply would be 
 
 141. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995)). 
 142. See Shakow, supra note 140, at 208. 
 143. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
 144. Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 308 (2d Cir. 2013) 
 145. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(i). 
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if the poster’s message described Louboutin stilettos’ 
conformance or nonconformance to Islamic ideals.146 
Other fair use exclusions include parody, criticism, and 
commenting upon the mark.147  The Flemish group’s poster 
would not qualify as a parody.  This is because it did not 
“imitate and then comically transform” Louboutin, its shoes, 
or its mark, in an ambiguous or complex meta-fictional 
way.148  The poster also did not criticize or comment on 
Louboutin or his goods; instead the poster criticized Islamic 
beliefs and promoted xenophobia—neither having anything to 
do with Louboutin or its shoes.  The statutory exclusion of 
news reporting and news commentary would similarly not 
apply because the Flemish group did not transmit 
information regarding Louboutin or his goods through the 
poster. 
The last defense, noncommercial use, functions as a 
catch-all exception and will defeat Louboutin’s dilution 
action.  The group’s message regarding Islam and the 
Islamisation of Belgium is political in nature and therefore 
likely to be political, noncommercial speech.149  Under the 
TDRA, noncommercial speech is noncommercial use150 and 
noncommercial use is exempted from dilution by tarnishment 
claims.151  This leaves a court with little choice but to dismiss 
Louboutin’s dilution claim against the Flemish group and 
essentially deprives Louboutin of its ability to enjoin the 
Flemish group’s use despite its nonconformity with any of the 
specific fair use exceptions.  Because trademark owners 
cannot enjoin noncommercial uses, mark owners are subject 
to considerable economic harm.152 
 
 146. See New Kids on the Block v. News America Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 
308 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 147. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3(A)(ii). 
 148. Tyler T. Ochoa, Dr. Seuss, The Juice and Fair Use: How the Grinch 
Silenced a Parody, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 546, 548–52 (1998) (quoting 
Margaret A. Rose, PARODY: ANCIENT, MODERN AND POST-MODERN 54 (1993)). 
 149. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 150. Id.  Though Mattel was decided before the TDRA’s enactment in 2006, 
the language of the noncommercial use exception has not changed. 
 151. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(3)(C). 
 152. See John Zevitas, Comment, If it Doesn’t Fit, Keep on Trying?: The 
Court’s Attempt to Find A Place For Pure Political Speech in the Lanham Act, 60 
CATH. U.L. REV. 243, 271 (2010). 
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III. PROPOSAL 
To protect the underlying goals of the TDRA, Congress 
should remove the noncommercial use exception from the 
TDRA.  Furthermore, to protect First Amendment rights and 
the ability to effectively communicate messages using 
trademarks, Congress should take the “artistic relevance” of 
the Rogers test,153 and apply it to the TDRA’s exceptions.  The 
proposed statute would read as follows: 
The following shall not be actionable as dilution by 
blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this subsection: 
(A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair 
use, or facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by 
another person other than as a designation of source for 
the person’s own goods or services, including use in 
connection with— 
(i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to 
compare goods or services; or 
(ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting 
upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of 
the famous mark owner. 
(B) All forms of news reporting and news commentary. 154 
(C) Any use artistically relevant to a noncommercial 
message.155 
Eliminating the noncommercial use exception will promote 
the Lanham Acts’ twin objectives: preventing consumer 
confusion, and protecting mark owners’ distinctive marks 
from misappropriation and dilution.  As it stands, the 
noncommercial use exception allows the frivolous, 
unauthorized use of famous trademarks, along with their 
damaging repercussions, to persist so long as the use is not 
solely “to propose a commercial transaction.”156  The proposed 
statute will protect innocent trademark owners from value-
decreasing unauthorized uses and will justly curtail obvious 
attempts to “free ride” on a mark’s fame.  Moreover, the 
 
 153. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 154. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
 155. The italicized section (C) would replace the noncommercial use 
exception in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C). 
 156. Bolgers v. Young Drug Prods Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (quoting 
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 762 (1976)). 
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general public will continue to have broad First Amendment 
protections through the TDRA’s numerous existing exceptions 
and the proposed artistic relevance exception.  With this 
proposal, the general public may continue to criticize, make 
fun of, comment on, compare, describe, advertise, promote, or 
make any tarnishing noncommercial message using a mark, 
so long as the mark is relevant to the message.157 
A. Application of the Proposed Amendment 
Under the proposed TDRA amendment, a court’s analysis 
would begin by determining whether the unauthorized use 
would likely tarnish the mark.  Tarnishment occurs when an 
unauthorized user “associates a mark with something 
unwholesome or somehow damages the positive image the 
trademark holder has built up in the [mark].”158 
Once a court determines that an unauthorized use 
dilutes a famous mark, it may look to the newly enacted 
statutory defense, the “artistic relevance” test, if the other 
defenses—nominative or descriptive fair use, comparative 
advertising, parody, criticism, commentary, and news 
reporting—fail to apply to the unauthorized use.159  In 
applying the artistic relevance exception, the court would 
determine whether the mark had some “artistic relevance to 
the underlying work.”160  To do so, the court would examine 
the speech’s underlying message.  The Louboutin case, if 
hypothetically brought to a U.S. court, illustrates this point 
below. 
B. Louboutin Under the Proposed Statute 
Under the proposed TDRA amendment, Louboutin could 
bring a cause of action for dilution by tarnishment.  
Displaying Louboutin’s trademark on a poster expressing 
disdain for the Islamic religion is likely to associate its 
expensive, high fashion shoes with images of stoning and 
anti-Islamic sentiment.  Political associations or philosophies 
are naturally discriminatory against certain citizens, and the 
unauthorized uses of marks in such speech certainly damage 
 
 157. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3). 
 158. See Shakow, supra note 140, at 208. 
 159. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)–(C). 
 160. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d. Cir. 1989). 
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the owner and the mark’s image.161  For this reason, 
Louboutin may lose a good portion of its client base in the 
Middle East.162  Dilution by tarnishment is an appropriate 
cause of action. 
A court would next decide whether the use falls under 
any of the articulated exceptions to dilution.  Nominative or 
descriptive fair use, comparative advertising, parody, 
criticism, commentary, news reporting, and any 
noncommercial use of a mark, as discussed in Part II.B.2, 
would not merit a successful defense for the Islamic group.163  
This leaves the proposed artistic relevance exception. 
To determine whether the unauthorized use falls under 
the artistic relevance exception, the court would look to the 
poster’s underlying message.  In this case, the message 
pertains to Islam, and more specifically Islam’s treatment of 
women as either prostitutes to be stoned or housewives with 
floor-length skirts.  However, Louboutin’s mark—the red-
soled stilettos—is not artistically relevant to that message 
because with or without the red-soled stilettos the poster 
adequately communicates the criticism of Islam’s treatment 
of women.  This point is further illustrated by the group’s 
post-injunction tweet, depicting a similar image with yellow 
soles.164  This tweet demonstrates the mark’s irrelevance to 
the poster because the Flemish group’s message was not lost 
or even slightly lessened by the change. Instead, the group 
still communicated an Anti-Islamic message using a woman’s 
leg to portray different skirt lengths and its alleged “sharia” 
compatibility.  The Flemish group’s use of Louboutin’s mark 
had no significance or relevance to their message. 
Upon finding no artistic relevance, a court may enjoin the 
unauthorized use as unlawfully tarnishing the mark.  
Therefore, under the proposed amendment, Louboutin’s mark 
would be protected from the Flemish group’s free-riding use.  
The Antwerp Court and Court of Appeal in Belgium correctly 
decided Louboutin’s case, and should Congress implement the 
changes proposed, the result in the United States would 
 
 161. See Shakow, supra note 140, at 208. 
 162. See Sambridge, supra note 10. 
 163. See analysis supra Part II.B.2. 
 164. See infra Figure 3. 
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similarly protect Louboutin’s mark.165 
C. First Amendment Challenges 
Inevitably the proposed amendment will be challenged on 
the grounds of the First Amendment’s freedom of 
expression.166  Protecting trademark use in noncommercial 
speech is a laudable goal that allows the public to comment 
on a recognizable brand.  The proposed artistic relevance 
exception will maintain this protection.  Courts will retain the 
discretion to factually determine “artistic relevance” in 
unauthorized uses, rather than sweepingly deny trademark 
owners dilution remedies in noncommercial uses.  The 
TDRA’s existing exclusions—such as parody, criticism, and 
news commentary167—will continue to protect the public’s 
interest in free speech in most noncommercial uses.  By 
extending the artistic relevance test to dilution actions 
involving artistic, expressive, or political speech, the proposed 
statute will bridge any gap remaining in protecting free 
speech interests.  
In addition, unauthorized uses wholly unrelated to a 
trademark, but which nevertheless use that mark in an 
unsavory and reputation-damaging manner, are less 
informative and should allow for more regulation.168  The 
Supreme Court has promoted this view as well, albeit more 
controversially.  In San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United 
States Olympic Committee169 the Court upheld the Amateur 
Sports Act and prohibited San Francisco Arts & Athletics 
 
 165. Assuming courts will analyze the Anti-Islamic group’s poster as political 
speech.  See Henley v. Devore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2010) 
(“District Courts that have actually considered whether campaign 
advertisements are commercial in the fair use context come down on the side of 
noncommercial.” (citing MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., 
Inc., No. 00 Civ.6068(GBD), 2004 WL 434404, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004)); 
see also Cong. Rec. H. 1216 (daily ed. April 13, 1989) (statement of Wisconsin 
Rep. Kastenmeier) (“Political advertising and promotion is political speech, and 
therefore not encompassed by the term ‘ commercial.’ ”). 
 166. Some scholars express worries that free speech rights are diminishing, 
especially if First Amendment defenses are further limited, because users will 
refrain from speaking in fear of being subject to lengthy and costly litigation.  
See Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 
61 SMU L. REV. 381, 405–06 (2008). 
 167. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
 168. See Shakow, supra note 140, at 108. 
 169. 483 U.S. 522 (1987). 
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Inc.’s (“SFAA”) use of the word “Olympic” in promoting its 
“Gay Olympic Games.”170  Although the dissent chastised this 
prohibition as chilling SFAA’s First Amendment right to 
communicate its message of promoting social and political 
ideas,171 the majority brushed aside these concerns by 
focusing on mark owners’ rights.172  The majority reasoned 
that the SFAA’s use would “undercut the USOC’s efforts to 
use, and sell the right to use, the word in the future, since 
much of the word’s value comes from its limited use.”173 
More notably, the United States Supreme Court has 
never held that First Amendment rights are absolute.174  In 
United States v. O’Brien,175 the Court upheld a law that 
criminalized destruction of draft cards and upheld the 
defendant’s criminal conviction for burning his draft card.176  
The law did not unconstitutionally limit the defendant’s First 
Amendment freedom of speech rights because the 
government’s interest was “limited to the noncommunicative 
aspect [the burning of the card] of O’Brien’s conduct.”177  To 
determine the level of protection afforded to this speech, the 
Court articulated that the regulation must be within the 
constitutional power of government; it must further a 
substantial or important governmental activity; the 
government interest must be unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression, and the incidental restriction must go no 
farther than is essential to furtherance of that interest.178  
Here, Congress has the power to regulate trademark 
protection, it has a substantial interest in protecting mark 
owners from harm to its livelihood, which is an interest 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and lastly the 
restriction only restricts speech that harms famous 
trademarks through uses irrelevant to the underlying speech.  
By removing the noncommercial use exception and applying 
the proposed statute, Congress could regulate the 
 
 170. Id. at 525–28. 
 171. Id. at 567–70. 
 172. Id. at 534–35. 
 173. Id. at 539. 
 174. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 348 (1976) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 94, 96 (1976)). 
 175. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S 367, 382 (1968). 
 176. O’Brien, 391 U.S at 382. 
 177. Id. at 381. 
 178. Id. at 377. 
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noncommunicative aspects of unauthorized users’ message 
and protect mark owners from reputation-damaging 
unauthorized uses.  Unauthorized uses of trademarks, 
unrelated to a message, such as in the Louboutin scenario, 
frustrates the TDRA’s purpose in providing protection to 
famous marks. 
The proposed statute would also protect trademark 
owner’s First Amendment right to refrain from speaking.  
Corporations have First Amendment rights similar to 
individuals; 179 therefore, a trademark owner (whether as an 
individual or corporation) has its own First Amendment 
rights, including the “right to refrain from speaking.”180  This 
First Amendment guarantee cannot be protected if trademark 
law is not amended. This First Amendment guarantee cannot 
be protected if trademark law is not amended.  For example, 
in Louboutin’s case, the unauthorized use of a mark in 
political propaganda associates the mark owner with the 
Flemish groups particular message—one with which the 
owner wholly disagrees—Anti-Islam.  As in Wooley v. 
Maynard,181 where the Court held that a state could not force 
residents to display “Live Free or Die” on a government-
issued license plate,182 courts should strive to protect an 
entities right not to speak particularly in regards to speech to 
which it may be ideologically opposed. 
CONCLUSION 
Reputation and goodwill are fundamental to trademark 
owners.  Unauthorized use of a mark in unrelated political 
speech diminishes the protections that dilution law aims to 
provide.  Congress should amend the TDRA to protect 
trademark owners from exploitation by unauthorized users.  
By substituting the noncommercial use exception with the 
artistic relevance exception, Congress will allow trademark 
owners to enjoin unauthorized users from tarnishing a 
trademark when the unauthorized use is unrelated to the 
message.  By ensuring this protection to trademark owners, 
Congress will also alleviate First Amendment concerns in 
 
 179. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 236 (1976). 
 180. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
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noncommercial use dilution claims. 
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 183. Photograph of Christian Louboutin Stilettos, in Louboutin Wins Battle 
to Stop Anti-Islam Ad, SPECIAL BROADCASTING SERVICE (Oct. 15, 2013, 8:43 
AM), http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2013/10/15/louboutin-wins-battle-stop-
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 184. Photograph of “Women Against Islamisation” Campaign Poster, in 
Philip Blenkinsop, Christian Louboutin Wins Case Against Shoe Use by Flemish 
Far-Right, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK (Oct. 15, 2013), 
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 185. Photograph of “Women Against Islamisation” Campaign Poster, in 
Philip Blenkinsop, Christian Louboutin Wins Case Against Shoe Use by Flemish 
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